Coercion and the Selfish Impulse in the Theology of Reihold Niebuhr
Posted on 2004-11-10 at 08:03
Abstract:
Concerning Reinhold Niebuhr's beliefs on Coercion and its role in the society of Man. Writing this paper helped me to form opinions of my own about the nature and role of human selfishness and shortsightedness.
Paper:
Coercion is an integrated component of all extant governing bodies. As individuals living under these systems of government, we must be willing to explore the necessity of any system that uses such force to achieve its own ends. Reinhold Niebuhr, in his work Moral Man and Immoral Society, has attempted just such an exploration. In his inquiry, he has determined that coercion is not morally justifiable, but it is pragmatically justifiable. This conclusion relies heavily on his understanding of human nature, which while positive with respect to many Christian thinkers is none-the-less decidedly negative. He argues that coercion is a necessary tool for both social cohesion and social justice. While both are needed in the ideal society, social cohesion is the most logical first step, since without it there will be no justice. Therefore we will look primarily to his theories of selfishness, reason, and empathy that lead toward his understanding of the problems of social cohesion rather than his theories of benevolence and justice.
Niebuhr has claimed, in his work The Nature and Destiny of Man, Volume I: Human Nature, that, "Man has always been his most vexing problem" (Niebuhr NDM, 1). Man's selfishness is the root of many of his problems. Essentially, Niebuhr argued that human beings have an inherent selfishness which neither reason, empathy, nor man's inherent benevolence can overcome well enough to create, for any substantial period of time, an idyllic society. In his work Moral Man and Immoral Society, he stated:
This insinuation of the interests of the self into even the most ideal enterprises and most universal objectives, envisaged in moments of highest rationality, makes hypocrisy an inevitable by product of all virtuous endeavor. (Niebuhr MMIS, 45)
Selfishness, according to the above passage seeps into all that man does and cannot be avoided. But selfishness is not man's only attribute; he is also a reasonable creature.
Man's reason both hinders and helps him in the creation and application of equitable rules of conduct. It allows him to apprehend the nature of situations removed from his own immediate one, therefore it acts as a tool of the conscience, helping man to recognize the needs of others. As Niebuhr put it, "[R]eason tends to check selfish impulses and to grant the satisfaction of legitimate impulses in others" (Niebuhr MMIS, 29). That recognition then allows him to empathize with those needs, even when those needs may have never weighed personally on the individual empathizer. That is why Niebuhr preceded his earlier point about man's rationality with a qualifier concerning empathy. "Man is endowed by nature with organic relations to his fellow men; and natural impulse prompts him to consider the needs of others even when they compete with his own" (Niebuhr MMIS, 2). Further, man's reason can help him to reign himself in:
Human existence is obviously distinguished from animal life by its qualified participation in creation. Within limits it breaks the forms of nature and creates new configurations of vitality. Its transcendence over natural process offers it the opportunity of interfering with the established forms and unities of vitality as nature knows them. (Niebuhr NDM, 26)
That is to say, man has a sense of self-transcendence and through that quality he can choose to act against his immediate desires or needs. That sense enables man to see and act on the needs of others or of a greater whole even when the actions may oppose his personal exigencies or desires. That same sense of transcendence allows him to see himself and his fellow men in a different light. He can recognize injustice and social decay for what it is rather than merely for what it does for him as an individual.
The measure of our rationality determines the degree of vividness with which we appreciate the needs of other life, the extent to which we become conscious of the real character of our own motives and impulses, the ability to harmonize conflicting impulses in our own life and in society, and the capacity to choose adequate means for approved ends. (Niebuhr MMIS, 28)
Reason, in other words, affords him the ability to critique the world and his place in it.
Reason, however, is not man's salvation. With all these benefits come problems. While reason may allow man to see beyond the immediate---allowing him to empathize with those removed from him---that same quality allows him to see his own needs in a new light. He may see, through his reason, needs and wants that he never could have foreseen without reason. This perspicacious sight creates in man new greater needs and alarms him to otherwise unknown exigencies. That extended sense of self-preservation wars with man's sense of rationalized empathy. Therefore, though man can view the world in a greater light, that light is not without partiality.
While it is possible for intelligence to increase the range of benevolent impulse, and thus prompt a human being to consider the needs and rights of other than those to whom he is bound by organic and physical relationship, there are definite limits in the capacity of ordinary mortals which makes it impossible for them to grant to others what they claim for themselves. (Niebuhr MMIS, 3)
Partiality breeds social inequity and injustice, which are the exact things that man despises in others. This problem is accentuated when society assumes man will be capable and willing to bend to its motives and actions. Niebuhr, in his work The Irony of American History, addresses this point directly:
[The value and dignity of the individual] is threatened whenever it is assumed that individual desires, hopes and ideals can be fitted with frictionless harmony into the collective purposes of man. The individual is not discrete. He cannot find his fulfillment outside of the community; but he also cannot find fulfillment completely within society. In so far as he finds fulfillment within society he must abate his individual ambitions. He must 'die to self' if he would truly live. In so far as he finds fulfillment beyond every historical community he lives his life in painful tension with even the best community, sometimes achieving standards of conduct which defy the standards of the community with a resolute "we must obey God rather than man." (Niebuhr IAH, 62)
Thus man is in a constant struggle between self and community that cannot be won by either side except through compromise, which is difficult at best with a society that uses coercive means to acquire desired ends.
Niebuhr's view of reason does not match exactly with the Kantian view of human reason, which wants to set reason up as man's salvation. The Kantian view assumes that reason can make itself, or perhaps is itself, impartial and therefore can destroy biased social structures and actions. Reason, in this view, is much more powerful. It can be applied almost perfectly even in an imperfect society. While Kant didn't assume that reason would immediately resolve social problems, he did suggest it was through reason that those problems would eventually be solved. Niebuhr, it seems, had a rebuttle to this in mind when he wrote, "Reason is not the sole basis of moral virtue in man. His social impulses are more deeply rooted than his rational life" (Niebuhr MMIS, 26). Niebuhr seemed to be pointing to some quality external to reason that allows for true goodness. For Niebuhr, this was comprised of his inherent benevolence and his empathy. Kant did not acknowledge a soteriological need outside of reason.
It should be noted that the same reason that grants man the ability to better understand his self-preservational situation will also allow him to better see his hierarchical situation. As Niebuhr stated it, "The will-to-live becomes the will-to-power" (Niebuhr MMIS, 18). There exists a disparity between needs and desired that must be acknowledged in any successful social structure. Man is not content with mere sufficiency. Once needs are met sufficiently, man seeks more. "The individual or the group which organizes any society, however social its intentions or pretensions, arrogates an inordinate portion of social privilege to itself" (Niebuhr MMIS, 6-7). That is a product of his selfish nature. Hence to curb injustice and inequity in the face of a selfish people, society must force upon them mutually acceptable rules of conduct that will allow for maximum---though not perfect---equity and justice:
We take, and must continue to take, morally hazardous actions to preserve our civilization. We must exercise our power. But we ought neither to believe that a nation is capable of perfect disinterestedness in its exercise, nor become complacent about a particular degree of interest and passion which corrupt the justice by which the exercise of power is legitimatized. (Niebuhr IAH, 5)
Coercion, then, is a necessary and integrated component of all extant governing bodies. Therefore it is true that, "The society in which each man lives is at once the basis for, and the nemesis of, that fulness of life which each man seeks" (Niebuhr MMIS, 1). Kant would disagree about its necessity by arguing that we could resolve conflict and partiality through the wholesale application of our full reasoning capacities. Niebuhr objected, saying that we cannot expect reason to fully overcome self-interest. Niebuhr spoke directly to Kant's---and other idealists'---beliefs when he said:
Our dreams of bringing the whole of human history under the control of the human will are ironically refuted by the fact that no group of idealists can easily move the pattern of history toward the desired goal of peace and justice. The recalcitrant forces in the historical drama have a power and persistence beyond our reckoning. (Niebuhr IAH, 2-3)
Self-interest possesses a gravity, pulling man toward himself, in a sense, even when reason offers him a chance to move away from the self. "Human beings," according to Niebuhr, "are endowed by nature with both selfish and unselfish impulses" (Niebuhr MMIS, 25). This basic fact forces the necessity of coercion. Coercion, though not ideal, keeps individuals in check by metering out punishments for disobeying rules. The individual apprehends those punishments as distinctly opposing self-interest and thus he avoids them by following the rules set forth. "All social cooperation on a larger scale than the most intimate social group requires a measure of coercion" (Niebuhr MMIS, 3). Since society is no more than institutionalized cooperation, it must use coercive means to meet its cooperative objectives. Society is propelled along this forced path---continually resetting its goals and its methods, seeking perfection in coercion where none is to be found. Niebuhr saw little hope in self-perfection. The self, he argued was too muddled in its own delusions and selfishness to even see the problem correctly, let alone resolve it:
The modern man is . . . certain about his essential virtue . . . [and since] he does not see that he has a freedom of spirit which transcends both nature and reason . . . [he] is unable to understand the real pathos of his defiance of nature's and reason's laws. He always imagines himself betrayed into this defiance either by some accidental corruption in his past history or by some sloth of reason. Hence he hopes for redemption, either through a program of social reorganization or by some scheme of education. (Niebuhr NDM, 96).
Man, he suggested, is in a precarious position. The final note on the subject must be Niebuhr's most lucid example of destructive and necessary coercion yet---the ultimate example of both the necessity and the immorality of coercion. "Our dreams of a pure virtue are dissolved in a situation in which it is possible to exercise the virtue of responsibility toward a community of nations only by courting the prospective guilt of the atomic bomb" (Niebuhr IAH, 2).